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Trade, Development and Factor Movements
T. N. Sriniv asan

HARRY G. JOHNSON's contri bution s to economic thougb t on trade,
growth and develo pment were many, includ ing an i~cisi ve and access
ible
analy sis of two-se ctor neo-c lassic al growth , effect ive protec tion
and
genera l equili brium growth and, above all, the impact on develo pment
of
1
tariff s and other barrie rs to trade.
It is no secret that he was not
at all sympa thetic to propo sals for a 'new intern ationa l econom
ic order '
2
(NIE0) .
Nor was he persua ded th~t inward -looki ng polici es promoted
develo pment in poor count ries.
In remem berine Harry, it would be appro priate to look at the
changi ng NIEO propo sals in the light of what has been learne d from
the
experi ence of the develo ping countr ies over the last three and
a half
decade s and, in partic ular, the post-1 973 experi ence of those count
ries
in adjust ing to the 'oil shock '.

A compa rison of NIEO propo sals with

develo pment experi ence seems to sugge st certai n direct ions for
commercial
diplom acy in the near future .

I will also attemp t to look at policy

proble ms posed by .intern ationa l factor movements in terms of a
simple
theore tical model, in the spirit of Johnso n, who was an excell ent
theori st
and used simple models to illumi nate policy issues .

One of

my

motiv ations

in doing so is the resurg ence of migrat ion of labour from some
develo ping
count ries in the period since the sharp increa se in oil prices
in 1973-

74.

2

Origins of the NIEO Demands
Kenneth J. Arrow, a Nobel-Laureate and a fotmder of post-war
neo-classical general equilibrium theory, once pointed out that while
"the now demonstrated fact that flexible exchan~e rates are a feasible
way of conducting international finance is
-~ triumph of theoretical insights over practical men's convictions", one
of the two major failures of neo-classical economics as an explanatory
mechanism has been 'the incompa~ibility of recurrent periods of tm
employment in the history of capitalism with a neoclassical 100del of
general market equilibrium'.

The other failure identified by Professor

Arrow is of greater interest for my present purposes.

He argued that

'in~quality in econor.dc development among countries, and among groups and
regions within a cotmtry, provides a second and somewhat complicated
difficulty for neo-classical theory.

A purely neo-classical answer

would explain differences in per capita income by differences in physical
and human assets per capita.

This, of course, raises the further question,

how this came to be, which would require a fully dynamic 100del to answer.
But the more compelling problem is that the differences in income seem
too vast to be explained by factor differences.

Indeed, in the presence

of international trade, and especially international capital movements,
wage differences should be strongly reduced compared to what would occur
in autarchic states ••• "

3

Professor Arrow suggested that differences in the production
possibility sets of different cotmtries could be a possible answer, only
to dismiss it as a partial answer in that it raised further quesfions,
for the differences in production-possibility sets among contemporaries

3

can only be due to constraints on the transmission of knowledge, in a
broad sense, across national boundaries.

This led him to put his

finger on the failure of markets for future goods, in part because of
large enforcement costs with respect to future contracts as com~ared
with contemporaneous contracts and in part, also, because of the many
_.uncertainties about the future.

In particular, the market of credit

and capital goods, he suggested, are y,ost likely to be subject to
imperfections or even non-existence.

And non-existence or imperfection

of even a single market has spill-over effects on other markets and
can destroy the optimality o! co~petitive equilibrium.
Once non-existence or imperfect functioning of markets is
admitted, the normative characterization of a global competitive equili
brium as reflecting a~ efficient and Pareto optimal allocation of resources
among countries and individuals no longer holds.

And, if markets fail,

Professor Arrow arg~d that it was very likely that other social devices
would be invented, such as government intervention, codes of conduct
for economic agents or economic organizations with some power between
the nee-classical competitive firm and an all-encompassing government.
It should be emphasized that Professor Arrow's asgument for the
possibility of market failures is based on uncertainties about the
future as well as externalities about information rather than on the
traditional arguments about monopoly or oligopoly and exploitation that
NIEO proponents are fond of repeating ad nauseam.
I have quoted Professor Arrow's views at some length, not merely
because of his authority as an exponent of neo-classical economics, but
mainly because some of the original NIEO demands could derive some
analytical support from them.

Although I dare say many a NIEO proponent
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would be horrified at the very thought of neo-classical economics
being cited in their support!

Indeed, the perception that the prevailing

economic order of today, meaning thereby economic institutions such as
international markets for goods, capital and technical knowledge,
not to speak of government interventions in such markets through
~ariff and non-tariff measures, results not only in an inefficient al
location of world resources but also in an inequitable allocation detri
mental to the welfare of the poor citizens of the developing world)
seems almost to echo the failure attributed by Professor Arrow of the
neo-classical paradigm to explai~ inequalities in economic development.
It was thought that a "New international Ji::onomic order", with its
own set of government interventions, codes of conduct for multi-national
enterprises, conditions for the transfer of technology et cetera, would
move the global economic system towards greater efficiency and equity,
much like Professor Arrow's other social devices in response to market
failure.
This may be an overly rational interpretation of the NIEO
proposals.

But the reaction of the developed countries to the proposals

for a "new international economic order" was to brand them as totally
irrational.

In fact, Johnson himself viewed them as "essentially a

demand to replace the market system by a vast bureaucratic system" and,
he said, it was a "facile assumption that the international transfers
asked for will benefit the people rather than the governing elites of
the poor countries". 4

Johnson had in mind the problem that an imperfect-

ly functioning market system would be replaced not by a perfectly
functioning system of government intervention, as Professor Arrow had
in mind, but by a system worse than it replaced.

5

Sir Arthur Lewis, another Nobel Laureate, has traced the
evolution of the existing economic order with his customary insight,
brilliance and wit.

5

There is no need for me to tread the same path.

Let me, instead, briefly recapitulat e the broad contents of the NIEO
proposals, as adumbrated in Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of
J:he Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
The NIEO proposals included:
(a)

an 'integrated ' programme of price supports

at levels higher than historic trends for a group
of commodities exported by developing countries;
(b)

the indexation of prices of exports of develop

ing countries to pr:f.ces of their imports from developed
countriei:;;
(c)

The attainment of the target of 0.7 percent

of gross national product (GNP) of developed countries
for official development assistance;
(d)

the linkage, in some form, of development aid

to the creation of internation al reserves in terms of
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) on the Internation al
Monetary Fund (IMF);
(e) the so-called Lima target for shifting manufactur
ing capacity from the developed to developing countries to
the extent of 25 percent of world industrial output by
the year 2000;
(f)

mechanisms for the transfer of technology to

developing countries and codes of conduct for multination 
al enterprises ;
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(g)

preferential treatment in terms of tariff

reductions for the exports of developing countries to
the markets of developed countries without reciprocity;
(h) the establishment of an international food-grain
reserve; and
(i) debt relief.

It is not entirely a coincidence that the NIEO demands came
to be forcefully made soon after the success in 1973 of the Organiza
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in raising oil prices,
although it is true that the demands for preferential access to the
markets of developed countries without reciprocity, the commodities
programme and targets for official development assistance as a ratio
of G~P date back to the first and second sessions of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development.(UNCTAD), held in Geneva in 1964
and in New Delhi in 1968 respectively, as well as to resolutions of the
United Nations on the "development decades 11 •

It is also true that

disappointment that political independence did not transform economies
rapidly and that external aid flows were tapering off were also
proximate causes for the NIEO proposals.

But as Jagdish N. Bhaewati,

6

now of Columbia University, New York, has pointed out, it was the
dramatic success achieved by OPEC that made developing countries view com
modity exports, the excessive concentration in which was until then consider
ed as a sign of weakness, as powerful weapons for collective action to
exact monopoly rents from developed countries.

Even more importantly,

it was believed that if enough such rents could be earned, developing

7

countrie s could become consider ably less depende nt on the industri alized
countrie s for resource flows and acquire greater control over tne al
location of resource s.

It was even believed by some that a shift in

economic power, brought about by exercisi ng 'commodity power', wonla
gain for develop ing countrie s a greater 'voice' over the control of the
~wo venerab le Bretton Woods institut ions, ~amely the World Bank and the

IMF.
Response to the NIEO Proposa ls
The response of the develope d countrie s to the NIEO demands
at the politica l level has been the so-calle d North-So uth dialogue
which has been proceed ing in various fora and with varying sets of
particip ants.
such dialogue .

The Cancu~ Summit, held in October 1981, was the latest
T.1e response of the overwhe lming majority of economi sts

in the West who have thought and written on the NIEO proposa ls was, as
my

Yale colleagu e Carlos Diaz-Al ejandro has put it, 'to dismiss the

demands as the babbling of economic illitera tes seized by a fit of
passion '.

7

The commod ities programme was either dismisse d as unfeasib le,
by pointing to failures of such schemes in the past, or, if feasible ,
consider ed as more likely to benefit some of the industri alized countri es,
since they also supply a signific ant proporti on of the world market for
some of the 'core' commod ities of the programme.
in his inimitab le way:

Johnson put this view

'the faith in commodity agreeme nts as a panacea

survive s, particu larly (academ ically) at Oxford, the home of lost causes.
And, as is usually the case, the faith rests either on ignoranc e of past
history or the obstina te belief that what went wrong last time was attri
butable to lack of will or cleverne ss or to an unwillin gness to commit

8

sufficient financial resources to the enterprise, but never to any
difficulties that could be understood in terms of elementary economic
analysis.

8

Unlike Johnson, few economists noted, though, that agreements

such as the Multi-fibre Arrangement 9 and the International Sugar A~ree10
ment,
which are expressly designed to protect inefficient developed.country producers are all equally undesirable.

Those economists who

were sympathetic to the idea of stabilizing commodity prices argued
that it was beneficial to producers and consumers, in part because it
may help in a small way in the fight against inflation in the developed
countries and, in part, because intervention in agricultural markets is
a feature of developed economies as well.
The proposed link between SDRs and development assistance was
dismissed on the grounds that the need for reserve creation and the
.need for development finance arise from entirely different sources
and that linking the two would not necessarily serve either need adequate
ly or efficiently.

Besides, the pattern of distribution of SDRs to

developing countries under the 'link' scheme would not necessarily
correspond to a desirable pattern of development assistance, for the
poorest countries would be least likely to benefit.
It was conceded that some transfer of industrial capacity from
developed to developing countries, particularly capacity to process com
modities, may be mutually beneficial.

But this was to be brought

about, it was argued, .by 'deescalation of the tariff structures by
stage of processing' in order to 'to improve market incentives to
locate early-stage processing of primary products in the primary producing countries'. 11

The NIEO scheme for bureaucratically~plann ed

transfers of industrial capacity, not necessarily consisting only of
processing capacity, was rejected.

9

While a number of

books have discussed the economics

or the lack thereof in the NIEO proposals, in the political arena
some sobering changes have taken place in the last five years, even
apart from some concessions on the Common Fund for the commodities
programme that were made at the fourth UNCTAD session, held in Nairobi
-i.n 1976.

As of now, both sides seem much less hopeful of achieving a

grand global compact in which the industrialized countries of the
'North' would be assured of access to energy supplies, the energy
exporting countries would be assured of the safety and adequacy of
real returns on their financial investments and the energy-importin g
developing countries would be assured of generous development assistance.
Within the 'South', there is perhaps a grudging, although increasing,
realization that the hoped for solidarity is not there.

The economic

and political strengths as well as interests of the developing countries
are too diverse.

Even more importantly, their staategies for economic

development, as well as their political-philo sophical underpinnings,
differ widely from almost total reliance on the market for the alloca
tion of resources, as well as development finance, to varying degrees
of planning through government intervention in markets and quantitative
allocation mechanisms and reliance on bilateral and multilateral
official capital flows for development finance.

But this reality has

not extended to NIEO rhetoric; the resolutions of the Group of 77 in
United Nations fora still sound the same.

But the degree of enthusiasm

for these resolutions is no longer 'uniform' among the developing
countries.
The diversity was nowhere more apparent than among the partici
pants at the Cancun Summit itself.

Tanzania's approach to development
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is as different from, say, Brazil's as it is from that of India.

By the

same token, Tanzania's economic strength is minuscule compared with the
other two.

The Cancun Summit participants, although not yet the Group

of 77 as a whole, apparently abandoned the NIEO proposals for a oiscussion of energy and food-security issues.

12

The apparent concession by

the President of the United States to the principle of 'global
13
in fora other than the United Nations would appear to
negotiations'
have been motivated more by a desire to avoid open disagreement than by
a real eagerness to participate in such negotiations.
Be that as it may, nesotiations have to take place sooner or
later, even if the NIEO proposals are given up and even if the latest
proposal of the Grou? of 77 for agreement to be reached by 'consensus',
rather than on majority basis, is not acceptable to the United States.

14

After all, a lot has happened since Bretton Woods which, at the very
least, calls for a re-examination of the adequacy of the institutional
15 As Miriam Camps, of the Council on
framework established there.
Foreign Relations in New York, points out, a compromise will have to
be found somewhere between the status quo and an extension of the
principle of one-nation-one- vote to all international institutions.

The

world now consists of more than 160 nation states with significant
diffusion of political, military and economic power.

Even more importantly,

'there is, too, a lack of congruence between the economic dimensions of
many problems

and their political and social dimensions'.

This lack of

congraence reflects the fact that economic power is distributed
differently from political and military power, with some states being
important for certain economic questions, but not for others.

One

11

cannot bt~ agree with Mrs. Camps in pointing to the need for strengthen
ing global institutions, 'however complicated may be the task of doing
so, because of the diversity of states, the tension between the desire
for 100re autonomy and that for the fruits of interdependence , the dif
ferences between the scale of economic problems 3nd political and social
~tructures'.

16

The complications of the task, after all, represent

the heart of the NIEO proporsals.
demands.

They are not merely a bunch of economic

They are in fact political demands for a greater voice in the

control of international economic institutions.
Reverting to the Cancun SUJl".Jllit, one of its most interesting
aspects was the fact that some countries were not invited to participate,
while some (such as the Soviet Union) chose not to attend.

I do not

want to dwell on the debating points made by each superpower about the
other in this matter. 17But I do want to note that none of the Gang of_
Four:South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were at Cancun.

This,

100re than anything else, accurately reflects the yawning gap between, on
the one hand, the rhetoric of the NIEO proposals and, on the other, the
reality of the successful development of a few as compared with the lack
lustre development if not the outr·ight failures to develop of the many.
This contrast is of interest both in its own right and for the light
it sheds on what ought to be, rather than what is likely to be, on the
agenda of global negotiations.

Let me now turn to the development

experience in the period since World War II.

12

Three Decades of Development
It is by now well known that the three decades 1950-80
were a period of substantial growth for the developing countries as a

group. ·This is shown by almost every indicator of development in Tahle
1.

But the low-income countries did not do as well as the middle-

_income countries.
A number of studies of the development of individual countries
(and a number of studies in a comparative framework) are available.

Since

my interest here is in foreign trade, I shall confine myself to two sets
of studies sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic· Research (NBER)
in the United States. 18 The first, directed by Professors Jagdish Bhagwati and
Anne O. Krueger, was completed before the 'oil shock' of 1973-74.

It

covered nine countries, namely Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India,
Israel, South Korea, the Pnilippines and Turkey, and analysed the impact
of their foreign-trad e regimes on their economic development .

The second,

directed by Professor Krueger, -~f the University of Minnesota, covered
ten countries, namely Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast,
Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay and its focus was
on the impact of alternative trade ·strategies on employment.

The first

volume of the second study was published early in 1981 19 with two more
volumes to follow.

These two sets of studies followed earlier studies

for the Organizatio n for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD.),
covering Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and Taiwan, 20
and for the World Bank. 21

13
The Bhagwati-Krueger project focussed on three sets of questions.
(i)

What is the 'anatomy' of exchange-control regimes and how do the

complex quantitative and price interventions interact with each other
and with domestic economic policies to affect relevant economic variables?
(ii)

How do the initial conditions associated with the anatomy of the

exchange-control regime affect the economic impact of devaluation and how
if at all does analysis of devaluation under exchange control differ from
that under convertibility?

(iii) How does the choice of alternative

trade and payments policies aff.ect the prospects for economic growth?

22

Defining an import-substitution strategy or regime as one
which provides a higher effective rate of exchange for importing than
for exporting and defininr, an export-promotion strategy or regime as
one of providing almost the same rate of exchange for both, the study
found evidence taat the former regimes were characterized by considerable
dispersion in their structure of protection while the latter regimes
showed much less dispersion.

Import-substitution regimes are associated,

it was found, with lower export performance; and changing the overall
foreign-trade regime successfully in the direction of reduced reliance
on exchange control and increased liberalization, it was further fomid,
has paid handsome dividends in terms of htgher exports.

Sustained

superior performance in exporting depends on successful liberalization
that is maintained.
nowhere.

Occasional jabs at liberalization appear to lead

Comitries that succeeded in reducing the bias against exports,

such as South Korea and Brazil, have managed to register acceleration
in Srowth rates, whereas countries that have not done so have had poor
rates of growth.
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The contrast between the success of South Korea and the relative
failure of India in this regard is striking.

Manufactured exports of

South Korea were $10 million in 1963 compared with India's $630 million.
By 1977, South Korea was exporting manufactured goods worth $11.2 billion,
while India managed to export only $4.0 billion worth of manufactured
-goods.

Singapore and Hong Kong as well Taiwan show similar gains in the

export of manufactures relative to India.

Even in the volume of

industrial production, as measured by total value-added, India lost
ground to each of these countries.

In 1970, value-added in all manu

facturing in South Korea was 23 percent of India's figure and in 1977
this figure had risen to 60 percent.

An even more striking contrast

could have been made had similar data for 1960 and 1980 been available
for use. 23

This is not to suggest that the foreign-trade regime is the

only or necessarily the major cause of India's poor record.

But that

it contributed significantly to it cannot be doubted.
There is no support in theory or in empirical evidence that bias
towards import substitution is necessarily worse than a bias towards
export promotion, rather than neutrality between the two, in terms of
the efficiency of allocation of resources.

There is some evidence that

soeially-waste ful exporting did, indeed, take place at certain points of
time in South Korea. 24

As I mentioned earlier, however, in the NBER

studies export promotion was defined as the absence of bias, or only
negligible bias, in either direction.

It is nevertheless the case that

even if there is a mild bias towards exports its harmful impact seems
negligible.

There are several reasons for this asymmetry.

(i) The pattern (across activities) of export incentives in

-l
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Table 1
Indicators of Economic Development, 1950-80
1950-60
Rate of Growth of GNP per Person
(in 1977 dollars)
Industrialized Countries
Middle-Income Countries
Low-Income Countries

1960-70

3.1
2.5
0.6

8.7
5.5
5.0

2.4
3.1
1.7

3.9
3.4
1. 7

1960-70
Export Import
Rate of Growth of Foreign Trade
Industrialized Countries
Middle-Income Countries
Low-IncoMe Countries

1970-80

9.4
6.8
5.0

1970-80
Export Import
5.7
5.2
-0.8

5.1
5.8
3.2

1950

1960

1979

66.0
48.6
41.5

70.0
53.0
47.0

74.0
61.0
57.0

1950

1960

1976

95
48
22

97
53
28

99
72

Life Expectancy at Birth
Industrialized Countries
Middle-Income Countries
Low-Income Countries

Adult Literacy (Percent)

Industralized Countries
Middle-Income Countries
Low-Income Countries

Source:

50

World Development Report for 1980 and for 1981, World Bank,
Washington. The story behind these averages and the substantial
variation between countries is well documented in a number of
studies, particularly those of the World Bank.
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capa citie s and inven torie s of impo rted goods , where
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.regim es, which rely on price incen tives , this tende
ct forei gn inves tmen t
(iii) an expo rt-pro motio n regim e is likel y to attra
comp arativ e adva ntage .
into activ ities in which the dome stic economy has a
f-jum ping ' types
By cont rast, impo rt-su bstit ution regim es attra ct 'tarif
. (iv) A succ essfu l
-of inves tmen t, which is harm ful in most situa tions
the economy
expo rt-pro motio n regim e, by raisi ng expo rts, will make
posit ive effec ts of
credi twor thy for forei gn lend ers. (v) Fina lly, the
gains from inter natio n
econo mies of scale , leam ing by doing , effic iency
often reali zed
al rathe r than dome stic comp etitio n et ceter a are more
with an expo rt-pro motio n regim e.
ssor
The secon d set of NBER studi es, those direc ted by Profe
expo rt-pro motio n
Krue ger, also appea rs to confi rm the supe riori ty of
expo rt-or iente d
strat egie s. "Give n reaso nably open mark ets abroa d,
or could have been in
polic ies have been more favou rable in some cases ,
ding employment in
othe rs, than impo rt-su bstit ution polic ies in expan
For exam ple, in South Korea , 'the effec t of
1125
i
d eve1opi ng coun t res.
in total employment
expo rt prom otion on employment was a rapid gorwth
1970, a chang e
in the 1960 s, a relat ively full employment since about
real wages than would
in secto ral distr ibuti on of employment and highe r
'coun try' studi es
other wise have been poss ible. ' Almost all the other
e adva ntage .
also show that expo rt indu strie s confo rm to comp arativ
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An even more striking feature of the advantages of outward-looking

development is their superior ability to withstand external shocks.

Bela

Balassa, of Johns Hopkins University, has shown that 'the newly
industrializing countries (NICs) responsed to adverse external shocks
through domestic adjustment policies in the form of export promtion,
·ilmport substitution and a (temporary) slo1o~ down in the rate of economic
growth, whereas less developed countries (LDCs) place reliance largely
on foreign borrowing.

At the same time, within both the NIC and the LDC

groups, outward-oriented economies made more successful domestic adjust
ment than inward-oriented economies [with the result that] after an
initial slow down, economic growth accelerated in the first group, where26
as the opposite result is observed in the second.'
The success of the outward-looking strategies of the newly
industrializing countries has been visible for quite some time.
raises two important questions.

This

The first is whether such an option is

viable for all developing countries, particularly the larger ones, and
the second is whether the industrialized countries will continue to keep
their markets open to the same extent for imports from developing countries
as in the recent past.
It trivializes the issue to ask, as one is often asked in India,
'what would happen if India and China attempted to export the same per
capita amount as Hong Kong', as if that were the relevant measure of
export achievement.

But it should be noted that imports from developing

countries accounted for only 2.9 percent in the apparent consumption
of manufactured goods in eleven industrialized countries in 1978, al
though obviously in particular coI!lillodities such as textiles, clothing

18
and footwear the shares were considerably higher. 27

Thus, in

spite of the slowdown in the growth of the industrialized countries,
the manufactured exports of developing countries could grow faster
through increases in their market shares.

This would mean a ~reater

threat to domestic manufacturers of import substitutes in industrialized
~ountries and leads naturally to the second question referred to above.
Before I turn to that, let me briefly note that the so-called South-South
trade among developing countries, ~hile undoubtedly helpful if it
creates mor~ trade along lines of comparative advantage, is unlikely to
increase in quantitative importance in the near future.

The share of

intra-Third World Trade has remained fairly stable in the range of 20-

25 percent over the perioc 1963-77 and there is no reason to believe that
a bias towards trade with developed countries was the reason for this

stability. 28
Turning now to the second question, there is no denying that even
though the 1960s and the 1970s were a period of increasing openness in
world trade, there is no assurance that this trend will continue in the
1980s.

Adjustment in the industrialized countries to import competi-

tion was far easier in an environment of full employment and growing
real incomes as in the earlier period than in the present period of slow
growth interrupted by periodic recessions.

With no early prospect of

resumption of vigorous growth, the protectionist tide is rising in
industrialized countries.

And, strange as it may seem, there is even

some intellectual support for protection in some countries.

Just as

Johnson castigated Oxford for being the defender of the faith in commooity
agreements, one may castigate Cambridge, as he would have done, for
29
championing the cause of senile-industry protection!

19
In the literature on international trade theory there is a
minor boom consisting of theoretical analyses of the politics and
economics of trade barriers.
into this litarature.

30

This is not the place to delve deeply

One important point that emerges is that, as

long as the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (CATT)
-are followed, protection can be increased

through exceptions to

those rules under 'safeguard' clauses or whatever.

31

But bureaucratic

or administrative protection is becoming an increasingly important way
of exploiting these provisions for d~partures from the rules even going
beyond them, as in the Multi-fibre Arrangement, to increase protection.
If realized, the threat to the openness of the international
trading system would do f~r greater harm to the interests of developing
countries than any failure to achieve, in full measure, the NIEO proposals.
It is disappointing that developing countries have not played a significant
role to date in multilateral trade negotiations or in other GATT activities.
It is also ironic in that in GATT negotiations, unlike the deliberations
It

of the IMF or the World Bank, there is no weighted system of voting.

would be extremely myopic on the part of the developing countries to ignore
that invocation of safeguard clauses, bilateral 'voluntary' export-restrain t
agreements, the col!Ullon agricultural policy of the European Community and
the 'trigger-price' mechanism on steel imports in the United States
just because they bear chiefly on trade between developed countries.

32

By participating fully in CATT discussions and taking a stand against
any and all protectionist measures and by moving towards reciprocity,
rather than demanding special treatment as part of the NIEO proposals,
developing countries stand to gain much more.
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Returning, for a moment, to the adjustment policies pursued
by developing in response to the oil shock, I have already mentioned
their recourse to international borrowing.

A second source that eased

the adjustment problems of some, but not all, developing countri~s was
the opportunities for employment that opened up in the oil-exporting and
labour-scare~ economies of Western Asia.

Tl.le remittances from workers

who migrated to these countries were eubstantial in the case of a number
of countries--often even exceed:fng the value of their merchandise exports.
Thus both flows of capital and labour across national boundaries have
been of significance in the adjustment process.

It is therefore of some

interest to examiue the theory of international factor movements.
Factor Movements and International Trade 1 ~
Neo-classical tnade theory, based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuel son
model, predicts that factor prices will be equalizeo between countries
by the equalization of commodity prices through international trade,
provided that all countries share the same neo-classical tachnology in
which commodity prices uniquely determine factor prices (a necessary
condition for which being that the number of traded commodities equal
the number of factors) and that in the trading equilibrium all countries
produce some amount of each of the traded goods.

In order to analyze the

impact _of factor movements one may try to document the reasons as to why
the assumptions of the factor-price equalization theorem do not hold in
the real world.

One may also work with a model in which the presumption

of factor price equalization is absent.

One particularly simple and

stark model, easy to manipulate but with enough structure to illuminate
some interesting aspect£ of factor movements, is the so-called specific
factor model of Ronald W. Jones, of the University of Rochester.3~
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Like the standard model, it has two sectors, each of which produces a
commodity using two factors, one of which is specific to that sector and
not used in the other.

We may, for ease of interpretation, call the two

specific factors capital and land.

The factor that is used in both sectors

and is mobile between them can be identified with labour.

Land obviously

is immobile and labour and capital are potentially mobile.

Let us number

the capital-using sector as Sector 1 and the land-using sector as Sector
2.
The model can be interpreted in several,ways.

In one, Sector 1

produces an import substitute, while Sector 2 produces the exportable
commodity.

This corresponds to a developing economy exporting primary

products and attempting industrialization by augmenting its industrial
capital through borrowing from international capital markets or through
inviting direct foreign investment.

Where Sector 1 produces the exportable

connnodity the case corresponds to a developing country whose capital-using
export sector is an extractive industry while its import-substituting
sector 2 produces consumables including food.

In yet another inter

pretation, one of the sectors produces a Hicksian composite tradeable
good, the other producing a non-tradeable good.

Depending on whether

capital is used in the tradeable or the non-tradeable sector, we can
model the inflow of foreign capital into tradeables or into non-trade
ables, such as public utilities or transport.
The external environment faced by such an economy in respect
of commodity as well as capital markets can be modelled in one of two
polar versions.

The economy is a price taker in one or both markets

so that the volume of its transactions does not affect the unit price.

22
In the case of capita l market s, such an assump tion means that the
ecaoomy can lorrow any amount at a fixed rate of interes t or, alterna tive
ly, that fomgn ers will invest any amount in the domest ic economy at the
going domesti c rate of return .

At the other pole is the assump tion that

a
the economy faces a rising supply curve in its foreign borrow ing or
foreign -offer curve that implies decreas ing margin al terms of trade for
the home economy.

With regard to out-nig ration of labour the two polar

assump tions could be either the average (and hence margin al) inward
renitta nce per worker is consta nt or margin al remitta nce per migran t
worker declille s as the number of ~ut-mi grants increas es.

Foreign

investm ent, as contras ted with foreign borrow ing, can be modelle d by
assumin g an infinit ely elastic supply of foreign capita l at the going
d011estic rate of rental on capita l.
The policy instrum ents include an import tariff, a tax on
forei~ borrowi ng, and a tax on inward remitta nces or repatri ation of

profits of foreign investm ent.
not be optiaal .

The tariff and each of the taxes need

In additio n some imperf ections in the labour market

such as a minimum wage can also be introdu ced.

The demand side of

the economy is defined by a set of· conununity indiffe rence curves , the
use of which implies that lump sum transfe rs between individ uals are
feasibl e.

1.ach of the factors of produc tion is

supplie d to the extant of

its

availa bility.

assumed to he inelas tically
The compet itive produc tion

equilib rium of such an economy when both sectors produce tradeab le
goods can be easily shown in terms of a simple diagram (Figure 1).

Given

al value
the amount of foreign capita l and the terms of trade, the margin
product of labour (MVPLl) in Sector 1 is AA with0 as origin for measur e
ment of labour used in that Sector 1.

Let OL be the total labour endow-

23
ment of the economy.

With Las origin, we can measure the use of

labour in Sector 2 with the marginal-value-product (MVPL2) curve BB.
The two curves intersect uniquely at the point where OL is the amount
1
of labour used in Sector 1 and tt

1

is that used in Sector 2.

And OM, the

marginal value product of labour in either sector in equilibrium, is the
wage rate.

Given the equilibrium employment levels, the marginal value

product of land and capital in the sector in which each is used determines
their equilibrium rentals.
In this model equilibrium factor returns depend on factor endowments,
as well as commodity prices.

Even thou~h the econo~y is incompletely

specialized in equilibrium, equalization of commodity prices through trade
does not equalize factor prices.

Given the same commodity price, an economy

better endowed in land (capital) ceteris paribus, en1oys a hiizher equilibrium
wa~e because the marginal value product of labour in the sector using
land (capital) shifts up (as shown by the dotted curve CC in Figure 1),
leaving the marginal value product of labour in the other sector unaltered.

A higher equilibrium wage (OM' in Figure 1) in turn means lower

rental for both capital and land.

An increase in labour endowment lowers

the equilibrium wage and raises the equilibrium rentals for aapital and
land.

This result is in sharp contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model in

which in an incompletely specialized equilibrium factor prices depend
only on commodity prices and not an factor endowments.

But if, for

instance, capital movement between countries results in equilization
·rental rates of capital, then clearly all factor prices become equalized,
given that technology satisfies the constant returns-to-scale assumption.
The reason is that equal rental rates for capital implies identical
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capital/lab our ratios in the capital-usin g sector in each country.
in turn equalizes wage rates between cotmtries.

This

With wage rates and

commodity prices equalized, the land/labour ratio in the land-using
sector is equalized, which in turn equalizes the land rental rates.
Thus free capital movement in addition to free trade is necessary for
Tactor price equalizatio n in this model.
It is clear from the diagram that, at fixed terms of trade,
increasing use of foreign capital raises the marginal-va lue-product curve
for labour in the capital-usin ~ sector, leaving the marginal-va lue
product curve in the other sector unaltered.

This raises the equilibrium

wage rate and hence lowers the rental for capital as well as land.
Similarly, improvement in the terms of trade (that is, reduction in the
price of the importable in terms of the exportable) , at a constant level
of use of foreign capital, raises employment in the exportable sector
and lowers the wage in terms of the exportable.
of the importable goes up.

The wage rate in terms

The rental rate for both capital and land

goes up in terms of the exportable and goes down in terms of the import
able.
Consider now the determinatio n of terms of trade and the amount of
foreign capital.

If the country is a price taker in commodity as well as

capital markets, it is easy to see that the optimal policy is free trade
in goods and unrestricted capital inflow.

Optimal foreign borrowing

{or investment) will equate the marginal value product of capital to its
fixed foreign cost.

The gain to the economy is the rent accruing to the

intra-margi nal units of capital because mar~inal product of capital is
diminishing .

Clearly, even if foreign capital inflow is not pushed to its
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optimal level, any inflow up to that level is welfare improving.

If the

economy is a price taker in capital markets but faces diminishing terms of
trade curve in its commodity markets, the optimal policy is to have an
optimum import tariff for traditional reasons and leave capital inflow
unrestricted.

If the economy faces a

rising marr,inal~cost curve in capital

.markets, for reasons which are not hard to imagine, but is a price taker
in commodity markets, there should be an optimum tax on capital inflow
while commodity trade is free.

If it is not a price taker in either

market, there should be an optimum tariff, as well as an optimum tax on
capital inflow.
What if the economy is not following optimal policies?

It can be

shown, that in the case of rising marginal cost of foreign capital but
fixed terms of trade, if the economy f0llows a non-optimal unrestricted
capital inflow policy, there will be too much foreign capital inflow and too
little conunodity imports relative to the welfare optimum.

In the case

in which it faces a diminishinp, terms of trade while being a price taker in
capital markets, free trade in goods will lead to too much commodity
imports relative to the welfare optimum.

But one cannot say in general

whether or not there will be too iittle capital inflow relative to the
welfare optimum because the terms-of-trade effect of a non-optimal
level of imports affects the welfare cost of debt service or profit
repatriation (in terms of the exportable) associated with any given
level of borrowing or investment.

Thus, in either case, non-optimal

policy in respect to one market has a spill-over effect in the other.
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In the same vein, if an economy is a price taker in commodity
markets, but has an import tariff in place (instead of the optimal
policy of free trade), allowing foreign capital,inflow into the import
substituting sector from an initial position of no inflow has ambiguous
effects if the capital-using sector produces the import substitute.
The reason is that the gain from capital inflow due to an increase in
output net of payments of capital has to be set off against the welfare
loss due to its increasinp, the out,ut of the import substitute.

This

result is by contrast to the ca$e of capital inflow in a Heckscher-Ohlin
model as discussed in an article by Professors Richard Brecher
and Carols Diaz-Alejandro.
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In their case, given

· an equilibrium of incomplete specialization before and after capital
inflow, the gain in output due to extra capital is exactly offset by
the payments to foreign capital, while there is a welfare loss if the
output of the import substitute increases as a result of it being
relatively capital intensive.
Out-migration of labour raises the home wage rate and reduces
rental rates on capital and land as long as the commodity terms of
trade are unchanged,

If the marginal inward remittance per emigrant

is a decreasing function of a number of migrants, an optimal tax on
remittances will be needed to achieve a welfare-optimizing level of
migration.
An interesting analytical issue in this context is the following:

for an economy that is a price taker in commodity markets, between
the two alternatives of inviting an optimal amount of foreign invest
ment and permitting an optimum amount of out-migration of labour,
36
which of them leads to higher welfare?

Since both policies raise
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domestic wages and lower rentals, and since landowners and capital
owners are assumed to be compensated to the required extent through
lump-sum transfers from wage earners, that policy which raises home
wages more is the welfare-superio r policy.

The presumption is that

for an economy which is relatively poorly endowed in respect of
capital in a relevant sense, foreign investment rather than out
migration is welfare superior.

Analo~ously, for an economy better

endowed with capital than labour, permitting optimal immigration is
welfare superior to investing abroad.
If domestic labour-market distortions, however, create different
factor-cost conditions in the two sectors, then capital inflow could
be welfare worseninr, rather than welfare improving.

In sum, this

simple model leads to the conclusion that as long as the home economy
follows optimal domestic policies, which in particular implies that
there are no domestic distortions, free trade and free capital movements
are optimal for an economy which is a price taker in all markets.

While

the welfare consequence of foreign investment, for instance, could be
ambiguous, given a domestic distortion in the labour market, one has
to probe deeper into the reason for the distortion in the first place.
Unless the domestic distortion itself is an optimal policy response for
achieving objectives not summarized by the social-utility function,
the appropriate policy is not to restrict foreign investment because
of its ambiguous welfare effect, given the domestic distortion, but to
remove the distortion and allow foregin investment.
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Conclusion
To conclude, the developing co\llltries have a strong interest in an
open international trading system and, too, in capital markets that are
free of inhibiting restrictions.

Their commercial diplomacy will h~

far more rewarding if it is directed towards ensurine such a system
._ than towards special pleading or preferences, while negotiations
should go on in other fora towards increasing their voice, and hence
their responsibility, in international organizations.
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